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Justice and Home Affairs
in the Lisbon Treaty:
A Constitutionalising
Clarification?
By Brendan Donnelly Brendan Donnelly Brendan Donnelly Brendan Donnelly Brendan Donnelly*
The Lisbon Treaty represents a major milestone in the evolution of the European Union’s legal
order. Even if the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will remain largely intergovernmental
in nature, almost all policy areas of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) will come under the
“Community method”, forming a single Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in which
qualified-majority voting and codecision, as ‘the ordinary legislative procedure”, will be the
general rule. This contrast in the respective developments of the two “pillars” erected at
Maastricht reflects their different relationship with the bulk of the Union’s policies. JHA is the
obverse side of the coin which is the internal market: the disappearance of national barriers
between the Member States constitutes an inexorable drive to adopt measures under JHA on
the same legal foundations. Such considerations do not apply, in the case of CFSP, the impact
of which is mainly felt outside the European Union.
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
The use of the term “constitution” in connection with the
document adopted by the Convention on the Future of
Europe in 2003 was from the beginning a controversial
one. Critics argued that the sprawling and heterogeneous
text of the “European Constitutional Treaty” lacked the
coherence and concision
normally associated with
national constitutional docu-
ments. Above all, the Treaty
failed in the traditional
central ambition of constitu-
tional texts, that of placing
beyond day-to-day contro-
versy the major goals,
institutions and working
methods of the political entity
being described. Deep-
rooted differences of analysis
and aspiration between the members of the Convention
and the Member States themselves had inevitably led, in the
view of these critics, to a document of systematic vagueness
and ambiguity, which advanced the “constitutionalisation”
of the European Union not at all.
If there is some general validity to this criticism, it is not
a reproach which can properly be levelled at one important
aspect of the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon
which succeeds it. Whatever its other ambiguities and
evasions, the Treaty of Lisbon has achieved a very substantial
new measure of clarity on the future decision-making
procedures of one central area of the Union’s decision-
making, namely Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).
This significant new clarity can properly be described as
“constitutional” or at least “constitutionalising” in nature.
JHA matters are currently divided between the Community
(mainly asylum, immigration, visas, and judicial cooperation
in civil matters) and the so-
called “Third Pillar” (Police
and Judicial Cooperation in
Criminal Matters), in which
decisions are taken on a
more intergovernmental
basis. If and when the Treaty
of Lisbon is ratified, all JHA
matters will fall under the
institutional decision-making
procedures familiar to scho-
lars and commentators
under the rubric of the
“Community method”, which will be the general rule in a
single Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. All but a
limited number of JHA policy areas will be subject to
qualified-majority voting in the Council. The European
Parliament will play a full, parallel legislative role through
the codecision procedure (to be known as the “ordinary
legislative procedure”) in almost all cases. The European
Court of Justice (ECJ) will in time have jurisdiction to enforce
all JHA decisions: those provisions adopted under the
previous, intergovernmental framework of the “third pillar”
This significant new clarity
can properly be described
as “constitutional” or at
least “constitutionalising”
in nature.
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will be subject to a limited jurisdiction of the ECJ for a
transitional period of five years, after which the ECJ’s
normal jurisdiction will be extended to cover all prior
legislation in policing and criminal matters. Moreover,,
with the exception of police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters and administrative cooperation in JHA,
where it will share this right with one-quarter of the Member
States, the Commission will enjoy the exclusive right of
legislative initiative.
These changes mark a major milestone in the evolution
of the European Union’s legal order. More precisely, they
are the culmination of an institutional journey which has
lasted fifteen years, the decade and a half since the signing
of the Treaty of Maastricht.
Some recent history Some recent history Some recent history Some recent history Some recent history
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 systematised and extended
the scope of the then European Community’s activities to
two major new policy areas, Justice and Home Affairs
(essentially questions of internal security and civil liberties)
and the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP),
including the “eventual
framing of a common de-
fence policy.” Because a
number of European govern-
ments were at the time
hesitant to share their
national and executive
sovereignty in these sensitive
areas with the central Euro-
pean institutions, a specific
decision-making procedure
was adopted for these two
new areas of European
activity. This procedure
involved unanimous decis-
ion-making in the Council of Ministers; a limited role in the
procedure for the European Commission and the European
Parliament; and no role for the European Court of Justice.
This arrangement was not far removed from the interaction
of independent national governments, and hence widely
and accurately described as “intergovernmentalism.”
Although this system of decision-making applied originally
equally to both the Common Foreign and Security Policy
and to Justice and Home Affairs, the years since the signing
of the Maastricht Treaty have witnessed its progressive
dismantlement in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, but
its substantial maintenance in the field of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy. Whether or not the Lisbon
Treaty comes into force, CFSP will continue to be an area
of policy dominated by “intergovernmentalism.” Even before
the Lisbon Treaty on the other hand, substantial inroads
had already been made into the intergovernmental nature
of decision-making in the field of JHA.
It should not be forgotten that at the time of the
Maastricht Treaty’s signature there were already
governments which saw the new decision-making
procedures as simply temporary expedients, which could
be expected to wither away with the passage of time. This
view was in sharp contrast to that of the British Government,
which saw in the arrangements of the Maastricht Treaty for
JHA and CFSP (known as the JHA and CFSP “pillars”
respectively) a long-term “bulwark against federalism”. In
the sphere of JHA at least, this British analysis rapidly came
to need revision, when the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997
partially transferred the policy areas of “visas, asylum and
immigration” to the traditional “Community method” of
decision-making, thereby pruning back the area of
intergovernmental decision-making to only the most sensitive
areas of JHA – “Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal
Matters”. Future decisions in the policy areas transferred by
the Amsterdam Treaty to the “Community method” were in
some cases still to be decided by unanimity rather than
qualified-majority voting, but the enhanced involvement in
the newly transferred policy areas of the European
Commission and the European Court of Justice marked an
important break with the intergovernmentalist philosophy
of JHA contained in the Maastricht Treaty. The British Prime
Minister who signed the Maastricht Treaty, John Major, had
set himself and his government against any such dilution of
“intergovernmentalism” in the field of JHA. One of the first
actions of his successor as Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was
to accept this envisaged change and sign the Amsterdam
Treaty, although he demanded and obtained a specific
British provision in the Treaty,
allowing the United King-
dom to opt in, or to opt out
of new JHA legislation
adopted by the “Community
method.”
The Amsterdam Treaty
not only limited the policy
areas to which the inter-
governmentalism of the
Third Pillar would in future
apply. It also provided for a
process of regular review of
those JHA elements newly
transferred to the “Com-
munity method” but retain-
ing to various degrees
aspects of intergovernmental decision-making, notably the
unanimity principle. In 2004 this process of review saw
Member States agreeing to extend the scope of codecision
with the European Parliament and qualified-majority voting
in the Council of Ministers to all areas of “visas, asylum and
immigration”, with the exception of legal migration and
family law. 2004 in addition saw the end of Member States’
right of initiative for the JHA measures subject to the
“Community method” of decision-making.
Some more recent history Some more recent history Some more recent history Some more recent history Some more recent history
The year 2004 also, and even more importantly, saw the
agreement among Member States of the European
Constitutional Treaty, which proposed the wholesale transfer
of all remaining JHA matters to the “Community method”
of decision-making. Codecision and qualified-majority
voting would apply to most of these newly-communitarised
JHA areas, as they had come by 2004 to apply to nearly all
JHA areas previously communitarised by the Treaty of
Amsterdam. The right of initiative on JHA matters, until
recently shared with the Council, would be exclusively the
Commission’s. The ECJ would eventually enjoy normal
jurisdiction over what had come by now to be described as
the European “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”.
Commentators on the European Constitutional Treaty
were unanimous in regarding its provisions on JHA as
Circumstances and events
combined in June 2007 to
allow the implementation
of an almost universal
consensus that
“intergovernmentalism” in
JHA had had its day.
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being among the most significant provisions of the Treaty.
The “no” votes of France and the Netherlands in the
referendums of 2005 appeared however to forestall for the
foreseeable future further movement towards the complete
communitarisation of JHA. Indeed, efforts made during the
Finnish Presidency in 2006 to implement some of the
Constitutional Treaty’s JHA-communitarising provisions
were not supported by even a bare majority of Member
States. It came as a surprise to many that under the German
Presidency of 2007, such rapid progress could be made
towards agreeing a successor document to the Constitutional
Treaty, and that this successor document should contain all
the major provisions on JHA which figured in the
Constitutional Treaty. Indeed, EU Member States voted in
June 2007 to go in an important respect further than the
Constitutional Treaty, incorporating into the acquis of the
European Union the Prüm data-sharing initiative, which
facilitates cooperation between national police services.
If it seems puzzling in retrospect that the European
Council of June 2007 was able to take wide-ranging
decisions on JHA matters, while only a year before it had
seemed that the further communitarisation of JHA had
reached an impasse, two factors can be mentioned as
contributing to this volte-face. First, it is a well-established
feature of European negotiations that it is often easier to
agree a raft of measures in a Treaty affecting a whole
spectrum of sectors – where the disbenefit to certain
Member States of some changes will be compensated for
by more agreeable changes in other areas – than to agree
to specific changes in isolation. Second, political and
personal factors were structured very differently in 2007 to
their conjunction in 2006. By the time of the European
Council in June, 2007, Tony Blair had announced his
forthcoming resignation from government and probably
therefore had more freedom of political manoeuvre to take
decisions whose political consequences would primarily be
felt by his successor. Mr Sarkozy offered in the first days of
his presidency a new approach to European questions after
Mr Chirac’s departure, and Mrs Merkel proved herself in
the German Presidency of the European Union an expert
and conciliatory leader of negotiations. Circumstances and
events thus combined in June 2007 to manifest and allow
the implementation of an almost universal consensus
within the governments of the European Union that “inter-
governmentalism” in JHA had had its day.
Why JHA has worked out the way it has Why JHA has worked out the way it has Why JHA has worked out the way it has Why JHA has worked out the way it has Why JHA has worked out the way it has
Although a number of conjunctural influences came together
in 2007 to allow for the important agreement on JHA
contained in the Lisbon Treaty, it is clear that, within the 15
years since the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty,
the overwhelming majority of EU Member States have
come to believe that their interests in the field of JHA will be
best served by the use of the “Community method” in this
sphere. A number of interlocking considerations seem to
have led them to this conclusion, primarily considerations
of efficiency, of democratic transparency and of
administrative simplicity.
Even before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001
in the United States of America, European states were
becoming uneasily aware that the decision-making
structures they had given themselves in the co-operative
fight against major crime and terrorism were cumbersome
and ill-adapted to the gravity of the threats posed. The
attacks on the World Trade Center and other targets in
2001 encouraged European governments to seek a more
flexible system of decision-making in this field, one which
could not indefinitely be restrained by national vetoes, and
which more fully involved the democratic and judicial
elements of the Union’s institutional system, namely the
European Parliament and the European Court of Justice.
Moreover, although the original decision-making system
of the Maastricht Treaty had been a relatively simple and
straightforward one, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 had
led over time to a bewildering variety of legal and political
instruments in the field of JHA. It was an undoubted
attraction for many European governments of the European
© European Community, 2008
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Constitutional Treaty that it brought into the complicated
area of JHA an accessible and familiar simplicity of legal
structure. They were understandably eager to preserve this
simplicity in the Lisbon Treaty.
But there is perhaps another, yet more fundamental
reason why the fates of intergovernmental decision-making
in the areas of JHA and of CFSP have been so disparate
since the Maastricht Treaty.
This reason lies deeper than
the subjective analyses of
individual national govern-
ments and arises from the
nature of the issues involved
in the two areas. It is possible
to construct in retrospect an
entirely plausible account of
why JHA should relatively
rapidly have come to be
subsumed under the “Com-
munity method” of decision-
making and why it will pro-
bably be a long time before
such a fate overtakes CFSP,
if indeed it ever does.
The plain fact is that JHA
matters stand in an alto-
gether different relationship to the great bulk of the European
Union’s policies and legislation compared to that which
exists between these and the CFSP. Logically and analytically,
the area of policy and legislation known as JHA can
appropriately be regarded as the observe side of the coin
which is the European Union’s well-established internal
market. The pressing need for the European Union’s
governments to work ever more closely together to protect
physical security and civil liberties derives precisely from the
ceaseless deepening of the Union’s internal market. The
ease with which national frontiers can be crossed by
individuals, goods or money is a boon to citizens, but also
creates greater opportunities for trans-European crime.
European citizens born in one country, educated in another,
working in a third and then retiring to yet another may well,
through the circumstances of their lives, create challenges
and claims which purely national legal systems are ill-
equipped to address in a coherent and non-discriminatory
manner. Those affected, either negatively or positively, by
decisions taken in the sphere of JHA will normally be
citizens of the EU’s Member States, or at least persons
residing, temporarily or permanently, in the territory of the
EU. The relentless disappearance of national barriers
between the Member States of the EU sets the material
stage and creates the legal imperative for most decisions
taken under JHA. The EU’s internal market is itself pre-
eminently a product of the “Community method”. It is
hardly surprising that its pendant, the European “Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice” should come to rest upon
the same legal foundations. The aspiration of some to
regard the “JHA pillar” as institutionally isolated for ever
from the Union’s central achievement until now, the single
internal market, can be seen today as a highly implausible
one.
On the other hand, little, if any, of the above analysis
can be applied to decisions taken under the CFSP. The
impact of these decisions is largely external to the European
Union, with individuals and entities outside the Union’s
territory being the beneficiaries or victims of these decisions.
Inevitably, much decision-making involving the Union’s
bilateral relations with third countries will be opportunistic,
urgent, discretionary or confidential. All these are conditions
making less apt for law-making under the “Community
method” the decisions which constitute the CFSP.
Consciously or otherwise, national governments in the
European Union recognise this distinction, which allows
them to exert, both individ-
ually and corporately, an
infinitely greater degree of
executive sovereignty in
external policy than they
enjoy in the rules-bound
legal system which will in
future constitute the under-
lying structure of the Union’s
internal policies, both for the
internal market and for JHA.
In the negotiations which
preceded the European
Constitutional Treaty and the
Lisbon Treaty, there was little
appetite from any European
governmental quarter for the
substantial modification of
the CFSP intergovernmental
“pillar”. There seems equally little reason to believe that this
political reality is like to change in any immediately
foreseeable future.
The British exception The British exception The British exception The British exception The British exception
In the British political debate, institutional changes which
facilitate the taking of action at the European level are
frequently viewed in negative rather than positive terms.
The Lisbon Treaty’s extension of qualified-majority voting in
the area of JHA and other changes introduced by the Treaty
to voting weights and voting procedures in the Council have
been widely criticised in the United Kingdom as an
unacceptable infringement of British national sovereignty.
Such criticism sits oddly with the fact that the UK is among
the Member States that are most enthusiastic to see common
action in JHA, in the security sphere in particular. It does
however reflect the political predicament of the British
Government in the negotiations over the Constitutional
and Lisbon Treaties. This political predicament has been a
key factor in the British Government’s pressing for and
securing a number of special arrangements in the Lisbon
Treaty, particularly in regard to JHA.
While the Lisbon Treaty, for the vast majority of Member
States, has the effect of “homogenising” a communitarised
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the position of the
UK (and Ireland and Denmark to varying degrees) relative
to other Member States, is made only more anomalous. In
the Lisbon Treaty, the British Government has secured for
itself a generalised opt-in/opt-out from all newly-
communitarised areas of JHA. This change constitutes a
striking and objective difference between the Constitutional
and Lisbon Treaties, a difference British governmental
spokesmen have been eager to underline in the domestic
debate over the need or otherwise for a referendum on the
Lisbon Treaty.
It is, however, extremely difficult to see what objective
British interests will be better protected by the new,
generalised system of JHA opt-ins/opt-outs. At the time of
The relentless
disappearance of national
barriers between the
Member States of the EU
sets the material stage and
creates the legal imperative
for most decisions taken
under JHA.
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the European Constitutional Treaty, the British Government
had believed that its interests in the sphere of JHA were
adequately protected by the “emergency brake” system
contained in that document, a system which allowed
Member States to “revoke” their willingness to be outvoted
on JHA matters which seemed to them of exceptional
national importance. The impression cannot be avoided
that the change in British
governmental attitudes on
this subject between 2004
and 2007 was largely driven
by the need to find political
arguments in the Lisbon
Treaty which would legitimise
the Labour Government’s
unwillingness to hold a refe-
rendum on the new treaty. It
is in any case wholly unclear
what real use the British
Government will make of its
JHA opt-ins/opt-outs. It is entirely possible that the United
Kingdom will see its interests as lying for the great majority
of cases in associating itself with new JHA legislation rather
than standing aside. It is instructive, and ironic, that the
British Government today finds itself pleading two cases
before the ECJ where it would like to participate in JHA
measures, but is currently prevented from doing so.
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
It would be an unbalanced analysis of the provisions of the
Lisbon Treaty bearing on Justice and Home Affairs if
It must seriously be asked
whether the imagery of
“pillars” for the European
Union any longer has
relevance or validity.
excessive attention were directed to the undoubted
ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding the British, Danish
and Irish positions in this field. The real effect of these
ambiguities will probably be limited, and for the other 24
members of the Union the Lisbon Treaty represents an
undoubted clarification and systematisation of a central
area of the European Union’s decision-making. A
fashionable description of
the European Union at the
time of the Maastricht Treaty
was to describe it as a
pediment resting on three
pillars, the internal market,
CFSP and JHA. One of these
pillars has now not only
disappeared, but has been
incorporated into another
“pillar”. It must seriously be
asked whether the imagery
of “pillars” for the European
Union any longer has relevance or validity. A more accurate
depiction of the Union would be of a political association
that normally applies a standardised decision-making
procedure, to which there are only two exceptions, the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the governance
of the Eurozone, the latter of which is as yet an evolving and
incomplete system. If this radically simplified analysis of the
European Union comes to be generally accepted by scholars
and commentators, it will be a substantial “constitution-
alising” legacy from the Convention, the European
Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty signed in Lisbon on 13
December 2007.
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* Brendan Donnelly is Director of the Federal Trust, London. He
is a team leader in the Work Package on Institutions which EIPA
coordinates within the EU-CONSENT Network of Excellence.